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Abstract: Input-output analysis is used to estimate the labor content embodied 
in changes in manufacturing output resulting from changing patterns of manu- 
facturing trade. For ten OECD countries from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, 
changes in world trade of manufactures are estimated to have had a negative 
net effect on manufacturing employment of 3.5 million jobs, 2.0 million in the 
US alone, compared to a 6.2 million decline in actual manufacturing employ- 
ment. The employment losses resulted mainly from North-South trade. At the 
industry level, there were large losses in labor-intensive industries and in in- 
dustries that were strategically targeted by developing country industrial poli- 
cies. There were employment losses in nearly all manufacturing industries, not 
a mixture of winners and losers. Such a pattern may result not from surging 
imports from the South but rather declining exports to the South in the after- 
math of the 1980s debt crisis. JEL no. FIG F16, 024 
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1 Introduction 
The long-standing academic debate over the role of  developing country 
trade in the deindustrialization f the developed world was rekindled 
in the 1990s as developing country exports to OECD markets reached 
historic highs. On one side of the debate were those who claimed the rela- 
tive unimportance of North-South trade for industrial country manu- 
facturing employment (Krugman 1996; Krugman and Lawrence 1996; 
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Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999). On the other side were those who 
claimed that North-South trade contributed substantially todeveloped 
country deindustrialization (Sachs and Shatz 1994; Wood 1994, 1995; 
Saeger 1997). In this paper we use input-output analysis to estimate 
the labor content embodied in changes in manufacturing output (fi- 
nal demand plus intermediate goods) resulting from changing patterns 
of manufacturing trade - that is, we assess the role of manufacturing 
trade in deindustrialization. Evaluated are ten OECD countries, the G7 
plus Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands, from the late 1970s to 
the mid-1990s. We find that for these ten countries, changes in world 
trade of manufactures are estimated to have had a negative net effect on 
manufacturing employment of3.5 million jobs, 2.0 million of these in 
the US alone, compared to a 6.2 million decline in actual manufacturing 
employment for these ten countries over the period (OECD 1999). 
Breaking up the sources of these mployment losses between North- 
North and North-South trade reveals that they are driven almost exclu- 
sively by the latter: changes in North-South trade by itself are estimated 
to have resulted in 3.5 million fewer manufacturing jobs over the period. 
Changes in North-North trade are estimated to have resulted in a net 
loss of only 20,000 manufacturing jobs for these ten countries, with six 
of the ten countries estimated to gain employment from North-North 
trade and with Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands the biggest gain- 
ers relative to late 1970s manufacturing employment. For North-South 
trade, in contrast, all ten countries are estimated to have lost manufac- 
turing employment from changing trade patterns. 
As we enter the final years of the implementation f the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Agreement, with many of its tariff reductions back-ended for the 
2002-2004 period (for example in textiles and apparel) imports from 
developing countries are likely to rise further. While these changing 
trade patterns are a positive development formany developing countries, 
resulting manufacturing job losses in developed countries could be an 
important policy issue, especially if this period of trade liberalization 
coincides with a global slowdown in economic growth. At the same time, 
it is worth emphasizing that we evaluate the effects of manufacturing 
trade on manufacturing employment, not the effects of trade on the 
economy as a whole. The policy issue therefore is not so much job loss 
as such but rather job reallocation from manufacturing to other sectors 
of the economy. The case of the US is telling in this regard, for while 
changes in world trade are estimated tohave resulted in 2.0 million fewer 
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manufacturing jobs, with North-South trade accounting for 1.3 million 
of these, the US economy as a whole gained nearly 25 million jobs over 
this same period (OECD 1999). 
One of the benefits of using input-output analysis to evaluate the 
effects of trade is that it yields industry-level results which are partic- 
ularly useful in providing insights into the causes of manufacturing 
employment losses resulting from North-South trade. We identify three 
factors contributing tothese losses. First, consistent with standard trade 
theory and prior factor content studies, there are disproportionate em- 
ployment losses in labor-intensive industries, particularly in textiles, 
apparel, eather and leather goods, which account for 1.1 million of the 
3.5 million in employment losses estimated to result from North-South 
trade expansion for our group of ten countries. 
Second, large losses are estimated in industries that are not compar- 
atively labor-intensive but that have been targeted by industrial policies 
in a number of industrializing countries of the South. These indus- 
tries produce lectronic equipment (including consumer electronics and 
computers) and motor vehicles. 
Third, we find estimated employment losses in 20 of 22 manufactur- 
ing industries as a result of changing patterns of North-South trade. This 
differs from the findings of an earlier round of factor content studies, 
described by Wood (1991: 22) as follows: "All the studies have identified 
the same sets of winning and losing sectors. The losers include food 
processing, wood products, textiles and clothing, and leather goods and 
footwear. These losses have been largely offset, however, by increased 
employment in the machinery and chemicals industries" This picture - 
of distinct lists of "winners" and "losers" - is at odds with the findings 
of this study that industries differ mainly in the extent o which they 
suffered manufacturing job losses relative to the benchmark scenario. 
This suggests the importance of factors that cut across industries. We 
observe, for example, that while the ten developed OECD countries in 
the sample had a fairly steady increase in imports from non-OECD 
countries over the period, they also exhibited asharp decline in exports 
to the South in the first half of the 1980s, when a number of developing 
countries experienced slow or negative growth as a result of their debt 
crises. 
This paper contains five sections. Section 2 gives an overview of 
trade expansion with the North and South for our group of coun- 
tries, comparing patterns of import penetration as well as volumes of 
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trade with the South relative to volumes of world trade. Section 3 de- 
scribes the method of factor content results and then country-level 
results in the context of actual changes in manufacturing and total 
employment. Section 4 provides industry-level results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Comparing OECD and Non-OECD Trade Expansion 
This study makes use of OECD Bilateral Trade Database (1998a) in which 
the trade between our ten countries and the OECD and non-OECD 
regions are based on pre-1990s OECD membership. That is, the newer 
members of the OECD (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Mexico 
and South Korea) are included in the non-OECD region. Thus the trade 
between the ten countries in our study and the OECD and non-OECD 
regions provide an approximation of North-North and North-South 
trade, respectively, and hereafter we refer to the trade with the OECD 
and non-OECD regions accordingly. 
Import penetration is a commonly used measure of the presence 
of foreign goods in domestic markets, and is defined as the ratio of 
manufacturing imports to domestic consumption (domestic production 
plus net imports) of manufactures. Figure 1 shows OECD and non- 
OECD import penetration for the ten countries in 1978 and 1995. The 
ten countries have three things in common regarding these measures. 
M1 had higher OECD than non-OECD import penetration i both 1978 
and 1995; in terms of growth indicated by percent changes, import 
penetration i creased more for non-OECD than OECD trade in all ten 
countries; in terms of percentage point differences, however, in absolute 
terms import penetration i creased more for OECD than non-OECD 
trade in all ten countries. The levels of non-OECD import penetration 
are relatively low and their variance small, ranging from 2.9 percent for 
France and Japan to 6.2 percent for Australia in 1995. OECD import 
penetration ranges much more widely, from 4.8 percent for Japan to 
66.5 percent for the Netherlands in 1995. 
Import penetration is not a measure of trade performance, as it 
is essentially one-sided. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the 
three countries with the highest OECD import penetration, Canada, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, also had the largest increases over the 
period in the ratio of OECD manufacturing exports to imports (and 
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indeed are estimated to gain the most in terms of relative manufactur- 
ing employment from changes in OECD trade of manufactures).1 From 
the viewpoint of OECD countries, however, non-OECD import pene- 
tration has a different significance than OECD import penetration as 
regards employment effects from trade expansion. This is because trade 
between OECD and non-OECD countries is characterized by greater 
differences in the labor intensity of production than intra-OECD trade 
and in particular that exports from non-OECD to OECD countries 
are generally more labor-intensive than exports from OECD to non- 
OECD countries. As such, even if increased imports from non-OECD 
countries are balanced by increased exports to non-OECD countries, 
the differences in the labor intensity of trade will result in manufac- 
turing employment losses. Wood emphasizes this point in explain- 
ing his and Sachs and Shatz's (1994) estimates of losses in manufac- 
turing employment resulting from North-South trade expansion. He 
writes: 
The fundamental reason for this outcome is that the goods im- 
ported by developed countries are more labor intensive than those 
they export: it would occur even if trade were balanced and thus 
does not depend on the existence of a trade deficit, which is often 
portrayed as the culprit in the US. (Wood 1995: 66) 
An additional sense of the relative importance ofOECD versus non- 
OECD trade is provided by Figure 2, which shows non-OECD manufac- 
turing trade (exports plus imports) as a percent of world manufacturing 
trade in 1970-1995 for the ten countries in our study taken together. 
The measure never exceeds 30 percent over the period and does not 
show a strong overall increase. There has been a stronger increase in 
more recent years, however, with the measure increasing from 23 to 
29 percent from 1990 to 1995. This suggests that it is useful to fol- 
low up on earlier factor content studies, particularly Sachs and Shatz 
(1994) and Wood (1994), both of which evaluate the period up to 
1990. 
1 From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, the ratio of OECD manufacturing exports to 
imports increased from 0.90 to 1.04 for Canada, 0.80 to 1.13 for Denmark and 1.03 to 
1.15 for the Netherlands (OECD 1998a). The only other country in the sample with 
a comparable increase was Germany, for which the measure increased from 1.28 to 
1.39. These ratios are based on three-year endpoint averages for the identical span of 
years evaluated with factor content analysis, as noted below. 
35 
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Figure 2: Non-OECD Manufacturing Trade as a Percent of World 
Manufacturing Trade, 10 Country Total, 1970-1995 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
3 Factor Content Calculations and Country-Level Results 
Our estimates of the effects of changes in manufacturing trade on manu- 
facturing employment are based on similar factor content calculations 
as used by Sachs and Shatz (1994). 2The input-output model is defined 
as 
L =/~ [(I - A)-IT], (1) 
where 
L = the vector of changes in manufacturing employment associated with 
the changing structure of manufacturing trade, 
/~ = the diagonal matrix of labor coefficients (employment per unit of 
output), 
2 Our estimates differ in that we define final demand as domestic production for final 
demand plus imports rather than, as Sachs and Shatz (1994: 27) do, domestic produc- 
tion for final demand plus net imports. Generally speaking, these different definitions 
of final demand yield very similar results. However, there are cases (for instance, rub- 
ber and plastic products and fabricated metal products in Italy) where final demand 
as defined by Sachs and Shatz yields negative values, in that exports exceed the sum of 
domestic production for final demand and imports, leading to wildly inaccurate sti- 
mates of the effects of trade on employment. Very similar results are also obtained by 
using either domestic production or final demand in the construction of the trade ex- 
pansion vector. See Wood (1994: 72) for a discussion of the relative merits of using 
domestic production or final demand (value added) in the calculation of the trade ex- 
pansion vector. Wood concludes that "there is no single best way to do the calcula- 
tions." 
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I = the identity matrix, 
A -=- the technical coefficients matrix, and 
T = the trade expansion vector. T is defined as: 
T = (X 9s -  M 95) --  (X  7s -  MYS)(D95/DTS), (2) 
where 
X, M = vectors of export and import values, respectively, and 
D = vector of final demand, that is, domestic production for final 
demand plus imports. D is thus defined as 
D = [(I - A)Q] + M, (3) 
where Q = domestic production. 
Put in words, T is defined for each industry as the difference between 
actual net exports at the end of the period and a counterfactual level of 
net exports that would have resulted at the end of the period had the ratio 
of net exports to final demand remained constant over the period - that 
is, had trade propensities relative to final demand remained constant. 
When T is used as the measure of final demand in the input-output 
model, therefore, L provides an estimate of how trade has changed 
manufacturing employment from what it would have been had the 
structure of trade remained unchanged, with the input-output model 
accounting for the effects of T on L through demand for both final and 
intermediate outputs. T is constructed separately for world trade (OECD 
plus non-OECD) and non-OECD trade. This yields L for both world 
and non-OECD trade, with L for OECD trade defined as the difference 
between the two. 
This study makes use of the OECD's STAN Structural Analysis data- 
bases, which have the advantage ofhaving trade, input-output, produc- 
tion, employment and price data largely standardized across 22 manu- 
facturing industries. The ten countries in our study are those for which 
input-output data are available in these datasets. Input-output data are 
for 1990 for seven of the ten countries, differing for Australia (1989), 
Italy (1985) and the Netherlands (1986). All values are converted to real 
terms for the year of the input-output data and labor coefficients are also 
for the same year. Regarding the superscripts in (2), endpoints are cal- 
culated as three-year verages, to smooth out point-to-point volatility. 
Thus "78" refers to the average for 1978-1980 and "95" refers to the aver- 
age for 1993-1995. For some countries, data do not run to 1993-1995, 
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Table 1: Country-Level Manufacturing Employment Effects from Trade of 
Manufactures 
Number of Relative to Number of Relative to 
employees 1978-80 employees 1978-80 
in worker years mfg, emp. (%) in worker years rnfg. emp. (%) 
Australia (1978-92) 
World Trade -85 730 
OECD Trade -44 105 
Non-OECD Trade -41 625 
Canada (1978-95) 
World Trade 129 658 
OECD Trade 329 819 
Non-OECD Trade -200 160 
Denmark (1978-94) 
World Trade 92 321 
OECD Trade 114 570 
Non-OECD Trade -22 249 
France (1978-95) 
World Trade - 109 230 
OECD Trade 112 818 
Non-OECD Trade -222 048 
Germany (1978-90) 
World Trade 76 193 
OECD Trade 370 268 
Non-OECD Trade -446 461 
Italy (1978-94) 
WorLd Trade -59 155 
OECD Trade 83 403 
Non-OECD Trade -142 558 
7.10 
18.06 
10.96 
Japan (1978-95) 
6.95 World Trade -941 391 -6.78 
-3.58 OECD Trade -345 861 -2.49 
-3,37 Non-OECD Trade -595 530 -4,29 
Netherlands (1978-95) 
World Trade 187 327 18.18 
OECD Trade 280 588 27.23 
Non-OECD Trade -93 261 -9.05 
United Kingdom (1978-94) 
18.60 World Trade -659 902 -9.04 
23.08 OECD Trade -152434 -2.09 
-4.48 Non-OECD Trade - 507 467 -6.95 
United States (1978-95) 
-1.99 World Trade -2021 256 -9.85 
2.06 OECD Trade -768 626 -3.75 
4.05 Non~OECD Trade -1252 630 -6.10 
10 country total 
--0.85 World Trade -3  543 549 -5.32 
4.11 OECD Trade -19560 -0.03 
-4.96 Non-OECD Trade 3 523 989 -5.29 
--l.01 
1.42 
--2.42 
Source: OECD (1998b, 1998a, 1995). 
as is indicated in the span of years following country headings in Table 1. 
Throughout his study, Germany refers exclusively to the former West 
Germany or the regions of the former West Germany, except as noted in 
Figure 1. 
Country-level results are shown in Table 1 both in absolute terms, 
i.e., by the number of manufacturing employees in worker years, and in 
relative terms, i.e., by the number of manufacturing employees as a per- 
centage of 1978-1980 manufacturing employment. Ten-country totals 
are shown at the bottom right of the table, indicating that employment 
in manufacturing would have been 3.5 million worker years higher if 
the trade structure had stayed the same over the period. This result is 
driven by 3.5 million in estimated losses from non-OECD trade and with 
OECD trade estimated to result in a net loss of 20,000 jobs compared to 
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the counterfactual. The 3.5 million in lower employment is equivalent 
to 5.3 percent of manufacturing employment for the ten countries in 
1978-1980. Looking at individual countries, three of ten countries are 
estimated to gain from world trade and six of ten from OECD trade. 
Each of our ten countries is estimated to lose manufacturing employ- 
ment from non-OECD trade of manufactures. 
The US has far and away the largest estimated absolute manufactur- 
ing employment losses compared to the other nine countries for world, 
OECD and non-OECD trade, with figures of 2.0 million, 0.8 million, 
and 1.3 million, respectively. These large absolute losses are consistent 
with patterns of net imports for world trade of manufactures, shown 
in Figure 3, comparing the US with the aggregate of the other nine 
countries in the study. The US ran a trade deficit in manufactures for 
every year after 1981 and showed a trend increase in net imports over 
the 1978-1995 period. The other nine countries ran trade surpluses in 
manufactures over the entire 1970-1995 period, peaking in 1995. The 
pattern of net imports for the US and the other nine countries i particu- 
larly divergent from 1990 to 1995, when the measure increased strongly 
for the US and decreased even more strongly for the other nine countries 
taken together. 
The figure of 1.3 million for the US in the case of non-OECD trade 
is equivalent to 6.1 percent of 1978-1980 manufacturing employment, 
just slightly higher than the estimate by Sachs and Shatz for the US of 
5.7 percent of 1978 manufacturing employment resulting from devel- 
oping country trade expansion between 1978 and 1990 (Sachs and Shatz 
1994: 29). Our results for world trade of manufactures nevertheless do 
differ substantially from Sachs and Shatz's as a result of considerably 
different estimates for OECD trade. Sachs and Shatz estimate that ex- 
pansion of world trade of manufactures led to a loss of 1.2 million 
manufacturing jobs (compared to our figure of 2.0 million) with nearly 
all of this resulting from trade with developing countries. Much of the 
difference between our and Sachs and Shatz's estimates appears to result 
from our inclusion of the 1990-1995 period, when the US manufactur- 
ing trade deficit increased by 76.4 billion (constant 1990) US dollars, 
with 44.7 billion of this accounted for by OECD trade? Although the 
rapid increase in the US manufacturing trade deficit in the 1990s con- 
3 In addition, Sachs and Shatz (1994: 10) use somewhat different definitions of North 
and South than we do. For instance, they include Spain and Portugal in the group of 
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Figure 3: Net Imports of Manufactures for the US and the Aggregate of 9 Other 
OECD Countries, 1970-1995 
Billions of 1990 US $ 
300 
200 
100 
-100 
-200 
-300 
m 
-400 , , 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
tributed to the estimated manufacturing job loss, it is arguable that this 
deficit was driven by the comparatively rapid growth ofthe US economy 
during these years and reflects, in this sense, economic success rather 
than failure. 
Next after the US, Japan is the country with the largest estimated 
absolute manufacturing employment losses for world, OECD and non- 
OECD trade, with figures of 0.9 million, 0.3 million, and 0.6 million, 
respectively. These figures might seem surprising iven Japan's well- 
known export success, but of all countries in the sample Japan in fact 
had the largest decline in its ratio of exports to imports for both world 
and OECD trade in manufactures. 4 
developing countries and the former Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the group 
of developed countries. 
4 Japan's export-import atios for world trade declined from 2.43 to 1.97 and for 
OECD trade from 2.00 to 1.84 from 1978 to 1995, based on three-year endpoint aver- 
ages (OECD 1998a). 
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The US and Japan also had the largest absolute number of manu- 
facturing employees ofthe ten countries, and for the purposes of cross- 
country comparison it is more useful to consider stimated employment 
changes in relative terms, that is in terms of overall manufacturing em- 
ployment. Figure 4 shows the number of manufacturing employees as 
a percent of 1978-1980 manufacturing employment (the figures are also 
contained in Table 1). Comparing non-OECD with OECD trade effects, 
we see smaller variations in the former. For non-OECD trade, the meas- 
ure ranges from -2.4 percent for Italy to -11.0 percent for Canada, 
with most countries hovering around -5  percent. For OECD trade, in 
contrast, he measure ranges much more widely, from -3.8 percent for 
the US to 27.2 percent for the Netherlands. The Netherlands, Denmark 
and Canada, in that order, were the largest relative gainers from OECD 
trade of manufactures. Accordingly, these three nations also had the 
Figure 4: Manufacturing Employment Effects from Trade of Manufactures 
(as a % of 1978-80 manufacturing employment) 
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Source: OECD (1998b, 1998a, 1995). 
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largest increases in OECD manufacturing export-import ratios over the 
period (see Footnote 1). These are also the only three countries esti- 
mated to have gained manufacturing employment from world trade of 
manufactures compared to the benchmark case. In addition, Germany 
also had sizeable relative gains and the largest absolute gains (370,000) 
of our ten countries from OECD manufacturing trade expansion. The 
large absolute losses for the US and Japan do not appear exceptional 
when compared with the number of manufacturing employees a  of the 
late 1970s. 
It is useful to situate results not only relative to late 1970s manufac- 
turing employment, but also relative toactual changes in manufacturing 
and total employment over the period as well as to changes in the manu- 
facturing share of total employment. This latter is the standard indicator 
of "deindustrialization." Table 2 provides this data for the beginning 
and end of the period as well as differences and percentage changes 
across the period, all based on three-year endpoint averages. All coun- 
tries except Japan experienced losses in manufacturing employment 
over the period, with net losses for the ten countries of 6.2 million. 5 This 
compares with the estimated 3.5 million in manufacturing employment 
losses from non-OECD manufacturing trade xpansion for the ten coun- 
tries, meaning that such trade is equivalent to over half (56.7 percent) 
of actual manufacturing employment losses. Note that these figures are 
not adjusted in any way, such as that proposed by Wood (1995) who ar- 
gues that factor content calculations underestimate the negative ffects 
of North-South trade of manufactures on manufacturing employment 
in the North. 6 
5 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999: 31)suggest that the experience of Japan in this 
regard may result from the exceptional decline  the relative price of manufactured 
goods, which stimulated domestic d mand for these goods. 
6 Wood has argued that employment estimates from factor content calculations such 
as used in Sachs and Shatz (1994) and in our study of the effects of North-South trade 
on manufacturing employment in the North should be roughly quadrupled (Wood: 
1995). Wood argues that the estimates should be oubled based on the greater la- 
bor intensity within industries of "non-competing" imports from the South and then 
doubled again based on his estimates of the effects of trade competition on labor- 
displacing technical change in the traded goods sector. However, Wood's adju tments 
result in what seem to be improbably high estimates of the effects of North-South 
trade expansion manufacturing employment losses in the North. We find, for in- 
stance, an estimated loss of 3.5 million manufacturing jobs in our ten countries as 
a result of non-OECD manufacturing trade expansion. Leaving aside the second ad- 
justment, he doubled figure of 7.0 million as per Wood's first adjustment compares to 
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All ten countries experienced deindustrialization ver the period, 
with particularly large percentage change declines (over 25 percent) 
in the manufacturing share of total employment in Australia, Canada, 
France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. However, all countries 
also experienced increases in total employment over the period, with 
especially strong increases in Australia, Canada nd the US, all among 
those countries experiencing the most rapid deindustrialization. Total 
employment increased for the ten countries by 41.6 million over the 
period. Setting the 6.2 million in manufacturing employment losses 
against the 41.6 million in total employment gains, it is clear that dein- 
dustrialization is driven more by increases in total employment rather 
than by declines in manufacturing employment. This is especially so in 
the cases of Australia, Canada and the US, where exceptionally rapid 
deindustrialization results not from exceptionally high rates of manu- 
facturing employment loss, but rather from exceptionally high rates of 
total employment gain. 
Precisely how much of deindustrialization is accounted for by non- 
OECD manufacturing trade expansion? For the ten countries, manufac- 
turing employment asa percentage oftotal employment declined from 
24.6 to 19.3 percent over the period, or by 5.3 percentage points. If we 
assume that manufacturing employment a  the end of the period would 
have been higher by 3.5 million in the absence of changes in the structure 
of non-OECD trade, then manufacturing employment asa percentage 
of total employment would have declined by 4.1 percentage points. 
This means that non-OECD trade expansion is estimated to account 
for 21.5 percent of deindustrialization. This is similar to estimates from 
earlier studies of North-South trade expansion on deindustrialization 
in the North, based on panel data econometric models and evaluating 
different periods and using somewhat different definitions of North and 
South. For instance, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy arrive at an estimate 
of 20 percent, based on a sample of 18 OECD countries evaluated over 
the 1970-1994 period (1999). Saeger (1997) estimates that 25-30 per- 
cent of the decline in the manufacturing share of total employment in
an actual decline in manufacturing employment of 6.2 million for these ten countries 
over the same period. Given that other factors are also found in other studies to con- 
tribute substantially to deindustrialization (such as shifts in the structure of demand 
away from manufactured goods and labor-displacing technical change not induced by 
trade (Saeger 1997; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999)), the adjusted figure of 7.0 mil- 
lion appears quite high, let alone the redoubled figure of 14.0 million. 
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Table 2: Changes in Employment andDeindustrialization 
(based on 3-year endpoint averages) 
Beginning End of Absolute Percent 
of period period difference change 
A. Manufacturing employment 
Australia (t978-1992) 1 233 333 1 143 333 -90 000 -7.30 
Canada (1978-1995) 1 825 933 1 671 227 -154 707 -8.47 
Denmark (1978-1994) 496 337 483 098 - 13 239 -2.67 
France (1978-1995) 5 476 900 4 055 500 -1 421 400 -25.95 
Germany (1978-1990) 9 003 667 8 731 000 -272 667 -3.03 
Italy (1978-1994) 5 882 033 4 684 767 - 1 197 267 -20.35 
Japan (1978-1995) 13 888 000 15 400 333 1 512 333 10.89 
Netherlands (1978-1995) 1 030333 894333 -136000 -13.20 
United Kingdom (1978-1994) 7301000 4981 503 -2  319497 -31.77 
United States (1978-1995) 20 521 000 18 396 667 -2  124 333 -10.35 
Total 66 658 537 60 441 761 -6  216 776 -9.33 
B. Total employment 
Australia (1978-1992) 6 201 040 7 771 123 1 570 083 25.32 
Canada (1978-1995) 10 719 650 13 271 164 2 551 514 23.80 
Denmark (1978-1994) 2 476 923 2 539 833 62 910 2.54 
France (1978-1995) 21 972 500 22 300 442 327 942 1.49 
Germany (1978-1990) 26 559 333 27 799 333 1 240 000 4.67 
Italy (1978-1994) 20 460 196 20 524 917 64 721 0.32 
Japan (1978-1995) 54 745 847 64 536 164 9 790 317 17.88 
Netherlands (1978-1995) 5 120 628 5 969 333 848 705 16.57 
United Kingdom (1978-1994) 25 261 976 25 712 027 450 051 1.78 
United States (1978-1995) 98 058 250 t22 745 139 24 686 889 25.18 
Total 271 576 344 313 169476 41593 132 15.32 
C. Manufacturing employment as a 
percent of total employment 
Australia (1978-1992) 19.89 14.71 -5.18 -26.03 
Canada (1978-1995) 17.03 12.59 -4.44 -26.07 
Denmark (1978-1994) 20.04 19.02 -1.02 -5.08 
France (1978-1995) 24.93 18.19 -6.74 -27.04 
Germany (1978-1990) 33.90 31.41 -2.49 -7.35 
Italy (1978-1994) 28.75 22.82 -5.92 -20.61 
Japan (1978-1995) 25.37 23.86 -1.51 -5.93 
Netherlands (1978-1995) 20.12 14.98 -5.14 -25.54 
United Kingdom (1978-1994) 28.90 19.37 -9.53 -32.96 
United States (1978-1995) 20.93 14.99 -5.94 -28.38 
Total 24.55 19.30 -5.25 -21.37 
Source: OECD (1998b, 1999). 
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the North is accounted for by North-South trade expansion, based on 
a sample of up to 23 OECD countries evaluated over the 1970-1990 
period. 
4 Industry-Level Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show industry-level results for OECD and non-OECD 
manufacturing trade, respectively. The industries in these tables are 
ranked from most o least labor-intensive, based on average ordinal 
rankings for the four countries for which labor coefficients are available 
for all 22 industries (France, Italy, Japan and the UK). The textiles, 
apparel, eather and leather goods sector is the most labor-intensive, and 
the petroleum and coal products ector the least labor-intensive. 
For the ten countries taken together, 15 of 22 manufacturing indus- 
tries are estimated to have lost employment as a result of changes in 
OECD trade relative to the counterfactual. There are four industries - 
timated to have gained or lost more than about 80,000 in manufacturing 
employment from OECD trade of manufactures. The only one of these 
four with estimated losses is radio, TV and communication equipment 
(-92,000), with losses particularly large in Japan. The estimated gains 
in wood products and furniture (79,000) are driven largely by Canada 
and Italy, and the estimated gains in fabricated metal products (94,000) 
were predominantly in Italy. Note that these two industries are com- 
paratively labor-intensive. The estimated gains in paper, paper products 
and printing (95,000) are driven largely by France, Germany, and the 
UK. 
For the four countries with the largest estimated gains (absolute and 
relative) from OECD manufacturing trade for the manufacturing sector 
as a whole - Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands - we also 
see employment gains across a wide range of industries. The US shows 
employment losses across a wide range of industries. These patterns 
are, we have noted, consistent with changes in trade balances for these 
countries for the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
For non-OECD manufacturing trade for the ten countries in total, 
there are seven manufacturing industries estimated to have lost more 
than about 200,000 in employment across the ten-country sample as 
a result ofnon-OECD trade expansion. Far and away the most import- 
ant of these is textiles, apparel, eather and leather goods, with estimated 
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employment losses of 1.1 million. 7 Employment losses in this indus- 
try are estimated to be particularly high in Japan and the US. Italy is 
the only country estimated to gain employment from non-OECD trade 
expansion in textiles, apparel, leather and leather goods, not surpris- 
ing given the country's well-known competitive success in the industry. 
Employment losses are also estimated to be high in other compara- 
tively labor-intensive industries, particularly in fabricated metal prod- 
ucts (-295,000), rubber and plastic products (-220,000) and electrical 
equipment, other (-329,000). Each of our ten countries is estimated 
to have lost employment in these three industries as a result of non- 
OECD manufacturing trade expansion, with particularly large losses 
across these industries in France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. 
These findings are consistent with standard trade theory based on the 
comparative advantage of developing countries in the production of 
labor-intensive goods. 
Employment losses are also estimated to be large in industries that 
are not comparatively labor-intensive, including radio, TV and com- 
munication equipment (-198,000), office and computing machinery 
(-215,000), and motor vehicles (-212,000). With the exception of mo- 
tor vehicles for the Netherlands, each of our ten countries i  estimated 
to lose employment in each of these three industries from non-OECD 
trade. Losses across the three industries are estimated to be particularly 
large in Canada, France, Germany (though data on radio, TV and com- 
munication equipment are missing), Japan, the UK and the US. These 
findings are consistent with the well documented export successes in 
these industries of a number of developing countries, especially East 
Asian countries. These export successes depended not only on the forces 
of comparative advantage but also on targeted industrial policies aimed 
at improving international competitiveness. 8 
There are estimated employment losses in 20 of 22 manufacturing 
industries, with the aircraft and petroleum and coal products industries 
the only exceptions. Moreover, estimated employment gains in these 
two industries are relatively small, summing to only 60,000. In contrast 
to the scenario found in earlier factor content studies of some winning 
7 An earlier study finds that the "gender bias" of the manufacturing employment ef- 
fects of North-South trade, with women estimated to experience disproportionate em- 
ployment losses, results from the effects of trade in this (labor-intensive and female- 
intensive) industry (Kucera and Milberg 2000). 
8 See Lee (1995) for a carefi.fl study of South Korea in this regard. 
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and some losing industries (Wood 1991), we observe mployment losses 
across the full range of manufacturing industries. This suggests he im- 
portance of broader, perhaps macroeconomic fa tors. Illustrative in this 
regard are the patterns of non-OECD manufacturing exports and im- 
ports for the ten countries taken together, shown in Figure 5. Note that 
exports exceeded imports over the entire 1970-1995 period. Thus the 
estimated manufacturing employment losses occurred at the same time 
that these countries ran a surplus in manufactures trade. The surplus 
does narrow over the period, however, and this results from the export 
rather than import side. That is, for imports from non-OECD countries, 
we see a fairly steady overall increase. Exports from our ten countries to 
non-OECD countries most often moved in parallel to imports. When- 
ever non-OECD imports were rising rapidly - for example during the 
early 1970s and the 1990s - exports were growing at a similar rate. The 
exceptional period is the first half of the 1980s, when imports were flat 
but exports dropped very substantially in the wake of the early 1980s 
debt crisis, during which a number of developing countries experienced 
deep recessions. Evidence indicates that the pattern of cross-industry 
employment losses results not from surging imports from non-OECD 
Figure 5: Non-OECD Manufacturing Exports and Imports of 10 Country Total, 
1970-1995 
Billions of 1990 US $ 
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Source: OECD 1998a). 
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countries but rather from a large drop in exports to non-OECD coun- 
tries. This suggests that slow economic growth in developing countries 
contributed to deindustrialization in richer countries. 9 
5 Conclusion 
We use input-output analysis to estimate changes in manufacturing em- 
ployment resulting from the changing structure of manufacturing trade, 
evaluating ten OECD countries over the period from the late 1970s to 
the mid-1990s. Employment losses from world trade of manufactures 
are driven by North-South trade and are equivalent to over one-half of 
the actual 6.2 million decline in manufacturing employment for our ten 
countries over the period. In this sense, manufacturing trade expansion 
is estimated tohave contributed very substantially todeindustrialization. 
Moreover, all of our ten countries are estimated to have lost manufac- 
turing employment as a result of expanding trade with the South. In 
contrast, North-North manufacturing trade expansion is estimated to 
have had only negligible ffects on manufacturing employment for our 
ten countries taken together, with losses in some countries offset by 
gains in others. If we define deindustrialization as the decline in the 
manufacturing share of total employment, we find that North-South 
manufacturing trade expansion is estimated to account for just over 
one-fifth of the 5.3 percentage point decline in this measure for our ten 
countries taken together. This is similar to estimates from other studies 
(Saeger 1997; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999). 
The industry-level results reveal three factors contributing to manu- 
facturing employment losses in our ten countries as a result of North- 
South trade of manufactures. First, there are large losses in labor- 
intensive industries, particularly textiles, apparel, leather and leather 
goods. Second, there are large losses in industries producing electronic 
equipment and motor vehicles, industries that were strategically targeted 
by developing-country industrial policies. Third, rather than a scenario 
of winning and losing industries, we find employment losses in 20 of 
22 manufacturing industries. This result is contrary to the popular view 
that trade has resulted in winning and losing sectors in Northern manu- 
factures. This pattern of across-the-board employment losses from trade 
9 A similar argument is found in UNCTAD (1995). 
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with the South is not the result of surging imports from low-wage devel- 
oping countries, but from the decline in exports to these markets in the 
aftermath of their debt crises in the 1980s. This suggests he importance 
of situating the debates on North-South trade and deindustrialization 
in a broader macroeconomic context. 
The macroeconomic context is relevant in several other ways. Defin- 
ing deindustrialization as the decline in manufacturing employment 
relative to total employment, for instance, we see this is driven consider- 
ably more by the 41.6 increase in total employment than the 6.2 million 
decrease in manufacturing employment for our ten countries over the 
period. It was also noted that for three of the countries experiencing the 
most rapid deindustrialization - Australia, Canada and the US - this 
resulted from comparatively rapid increases in total employment rather 
than comparatively rapid decreases in manufacturing employment. 
There is another sense in which the macroeconomic context is rele- 
vant to these debates. Public concern with the deindustrializing effects 
of trade, so prominent in the 1980s and early 1990s, largely died out 
in the late 1990s. This was certainly not due to a slowdown in imports 
from developing countries to developed country markets during this 
period. On the contrary, developing countries attained an acceleration 
of import penetration. But this occurred uring the long period of eco- 
nomic expansion in the 1990s and especially the impressive growth of 
employment in the US. During periods of more rapid aggregate d mand 
(and wage) growth in developed countries, low-wage import competi- 
tion is hardly noticed. It is when aggregate demand growth is slow that 
low-wage competition from abroad becomes central to policy debates in 
industrialized countries. 1°Today, with economic growth having slowed 
in the US and other industrialized countries, the issue of trade and 
deindustrialization may return to the center of policy discussions. 
Appendix: Data Notes 
This study makes use OECD's STAN Structural Analysis databases, the Input- 
Output Database (1995) for input-output data, the Bilateral Trade Database 
(1998a) for trade data, and the STAN Database for Industrial Analysis (1998b) 
for output, total employment, and price deflator data (the last derived from 
10 See UNCTAD (1995) for some evidence on this point. 
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data on value added in real and nominal terms). These datasets have the ad- 
vantage of being largely standardized by industry classification, following what 
the OECD calls an "Adjusted ISIC Revision 2 Classification;' for which there 
are 22 distinct manufacturing industries. 
The OECD Input-Output Database provides data only for the ten coun- 
tries considered in this paper. Input-output data for the most recent year avail- 
able are used. For Australia, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, input- 
output data do not perfectly conform to the "Adjusted ISIC Revision 2 Clas- 
sification)' Thus data from the STAN Database for Industrial Analysis and Bi- 
lateral Trade Database are modified to match the input-output data for these 
countries whenever feasible. For Australia, ISIC 3832 also includes ISIC 3825; 
for Denmark, ISIC 382 - 3825 also includes ISIC 3825 and ISIC 3843 also in- 
cludes 3842 + 44 + 49 and 3845 (where " - "  indicates "minus" not "through"); 
for Germany, ISIC 351 + 352 also includes ISIC 3522 and ISIC 383 - 3832 also 
includes ISIC 3832 (ISIC 3842 + 44 + 49 is omitted, as input-output data for 
it is spread among industries in such a way that a correction is not feasible); 
for the Netherlands, ISIC 371 also includes ISIC 372 and ISIC 383 - 3832 also 
includes ISIC 3832. 
Regarding the definition of the OECD and non OECD regions in the Bilat- 
eral Trade Database, the data documentation states: "The relatively new OECD 
member countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Mexico, and 
Poland) are currently included in the Non-OECD" region. 
Whenever possible, the analysis uses data from 1978 to 1995. As a result 
of missing employment and production data, however, the analysis runs only 
to 1992 for Australia and 1994 for Denmark, Italy, and the UK. For Germany 
(that is, the former West Germany), trade data include regions of the former 
East Germany after 1990, and thus the analysis runs only to 1990. In add- 
ition, employment data in Australia for ISIC 3845 run begin in only 1981; 
employment data in Japan for ISIC 3842 + 44 + 49 and ISIC 3825 begin in 
only 1984. Thus other data for these industries in these two countries is also 
truncated to match the shorter period. Employment and production data for 
ISIC 3842 + 44 + 49 are missing for all years for Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and the US; employment and production data for ISIC 3845 
are missing for all years for Denmark. These industries in these countries are 
thus excluded from the analysis. 
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